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Abstract Research on family firms provides mixed
evidence of the effect of family ownership on firm
performance and exit outcomes. Drawing on threshold
theory and the socioemotional wealth perspective, we
argue that family firms have lower performance thresh-
olds than non-family firms, reducing the likelihood of
firm exit. Using a longitudinal dataset of 1191 firms
over the period 2008–2011, we find support for this
contention, suggesting that performance threshold is an
important, yet poorly studied, construct for understand-
ing exits of family versus non-family firms.
Plain English Summary Why firms with similar eco-
nomic performance make different exit decisions? We
find evidence that family firms have lower “perfor-
mance thresholds” than non-family firms, reducing fam-
ily firms’ likelihood of exit. Using a longitudinal
dataset, we examine differences in performance thresh-
old between family and non-family firms and help clar-
ify why some firms persist with their ventures even
though their performance may indicate they should exit
the market. Our theory and related findings suggest that
nonfinancial attributes such as identity, the ability to
exercise family influence, and to hand the business
down to future generations may affect family firms’
attitudes toward exit decisions. Our study contributes
to sharpening our understanding of exit in family firms
while motivating future work on exit strategies in family
firms and other contexts.
Keywords Family firm . Firm exit . Firm Persistence .
Performance threshold
JEL classification L26 .M13
1 Introduction
Research on family firms provides mixed evidence for
the effect of family ownership on firm performance and
exit strategies (Siebels and Zu Knyphausen-Aufseß,
2012). One explanation may be that firms’ performance
only partially explains exit decisions (Guenther et al.,
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their decisions on many factors (Taylor, 1999; Wolfe
and Patel, 2019) and “performance is only one—and not
necessarily the most important—determinant of organi-
zational survival” (Meyer and Zucker, 1989, p. 9). Thus,
the simple “poor performance leads to exit” model is
underspecified and provides inadequate insights into
family firms’ exit decisions.
However, research shows that exit is important, be-
cause “shedding resource combinations that no longer
add value-creating opportunities is a critical dynamic
capability in Schumpeterian markets, and an important
component of the entrepreneurial process” (Salvato
et al., 2010, p. 321). Yet it is particularly challenging
for owners of family firms to realize that perpetuating
their business is only one possibility among many
(Chirico et al., 2018; Kaye, 1998). Family firms’ exit
decisions are influenced by factors such as emotional
attachment, long-term orientation, and strong family ties
(Akhter et al., 2016; Chirico et al., 2020). Scholars
observe that, when making strategic decisions, the pri-
mary reference point in family firms is loss of
socioemotional wealth (SEW), or the stock of affect-
related value that the family has invested in the firm
(Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).
Therefore, family firms may base exit decisions not
purely on economic performance, but also on their
own economic and/or non-economic performance
thresholds (Gimeno et al., 1997; Siepel et al., 2017).
Threshold theory posits that exit is not strictly depen-
dent on financial performance, but on performance rel-
ative to a firm-specific threshold (Gimeno et al., 1997).
Decision-makers with higher performance thresholds
may exit from the market if firms do not meet their
financial expectations, whereas those with lower perfor-
mance thresholds may persist with poor- or under-
performing firms (DeTienne et al., 2008; Gimeno
et al., 1997). The threshold perspective helps explain
why firms with similar economic performance make
substantially different exit decisions. Our study extends
previous research (e.g., DeTienne and Chirico, 2013;
Chirico et al., 2020) by examining performance thresh-
olds in family versus non-family firms and the role of
performance thresholds as an underlying mechanism
linking family firms and their exit decisions. Given the
different economic and non-economic priorities pursued
by family and non-family firms (Hoskisson et al., 2017),
understanding how performance thresholds affect exit is
key to understanding exits in family firms. Our theory
draws on the SEW perspective that leads family firms to
exhibit lower performance thresholds and thus lower
likelihoods of exit than non-family firms.
Using a longitudinal dataset of 1191 firms over the
period 2008–2011 (Kauffman Firm Survey, KFS), we
test the relationships surrounding performance thresh-
olds and family firm exit and argue that, as a result of
socioemotional benefits, family firms have lower thresh-
olds than non-family firms and are thus more willing to
persist with their businesses. Our empirical findings
support our hypotheses. As such, our research contrib-
utes to current literature in three ways. First, we build on
threshold theory by identifying a specific context with
differing performance thresholds. Our results support
Gimeno et al.’s (1997) work by providing empirical
evidence of differing performance thresholds between
family and non-family firms. Our study is also one of
the first to test the concept of thresholds as an underlying
mechanism in family firms’ decision-making. While the
threshold concept is used extensively in other literature
(e.g., pain, hearing, and risk thresholds), our work tests
the efficacy of its application to management and
entrepreneurship.
Second, our work contributes to understanding fam-
ily firm exit by identifying performance thresholds as a
crucial mediating mechanism, thereby helping to ex-
plain why family firms are willing to persist with
below-target performance. We demonstrate that family
firms have lower performance thresholds than non-
family firms and that these decrease the likelihood of
exit, thus explaining differences in overall performance
rates between family and non-family firms. Our study
also sheds light on factors contributing to family firm
exit (Chirico et al., 2020; Salvato et al., 2010; Wilson
et al., 2013), thereby responding to recent calls to ex-
pand studies of family firm exit beyond founders’ suc-
cession (DeTienne, 2010; DeTienne and Chirico, 2013;
Shepherd, 2009; Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Wennberg
et al., 2010). Finally, we demonstrate that investigating
differences in performance thresholds between family
and non-family firms may have important implications
for a growing body of exit research on the persistence of
under-performing firms. Under-performing firms im-
pose costs on the economic system, use resources inef-
ficiently, and increase uncertainty for competitors, in-
vestors, and employees (DeTienne et al., 2008).
Understanding threshold differences between family
and non-family firms may help identify other important
contexts and factors that lead to differing thresholds of
firm performance, which may have a lasting impact on
N. Symeonidou et al.
exit decisions.We discuss these and suggest avenues for
future research.
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
The question of whether family firms perform better and
persist longer than non-family firms has recently
attracted renewed research attention (Chirico et al.,
2020; Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2007; Wilson et al., 2013), producing mixed results.
Research showing positive family effects suggests that
family firms avoid agency problems, are extra vigilant
with resources, have a culture of commitment to long-
term objectives, scrutinize opportunities with greater
intensity, have access to wider social networks and
family resources, and have greater tacit or embedded
knowledge (Cruz and Nordqvist, 2012; Gedajlovic
et al., 2012; Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2006; Ling
and Kellermanns, 2010; Salvato, 2004). From a purely
economic performance perspective, these results sug-
gest that family firms will outperform and survive lon-
ger than non-family firms. However, other research
indicates that controlling families may use their control
for private benefit rather than to maximize firm value,
are less likely to reward non-family executives with
performance-related incentives (for fear of diluting fam-
ily control), favor family members for promotion rather
than selecting the most qualified individuals, are less
competitive, may be subject to intra-family conflict, are
less innovative, and have weaker governance systems
(Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012;
Mazzola et al., 2013). These “negative” factors suggest
that family firms may underperform relative to non-
family firms and on purely economic performance
grounds should be selected out of the market. Thus, it
appears that many positive and negative factors affect
family firms’ performance and exit.
Threshold theory offers a different explanation that
may help to reconcile these findings, as it suggests that
firm exit is not strictly dependent on economic perfor-
mance, but on performance relative to a firm-specific
threshold (Gimeno et al., 1997; Siepel et al., 2017).
Gimeno et al. (1997, p. 750) define performance thresh-
old as “the level of performance below which the dom-
inant organizational constituents will act to dissolve the
organization.” The scant research on thresholds reveals
that they are impacted by whether a firm has objectives
other than (or in addition to) firm performance (Gimeno
et al., 1997). For example, a founder’s identity may be
so tightly linked with the firm that (s)he may decide to
persist despite poor performance, rather than dealing
with the loss of identity and “self” associated with the
firm. Using Staw’s (1981) commitment to a course of
action perspective, DeTienne et al. (2008) identify en-
vironmental, organizational, and founder factors that
have an impact on firms’ performance thresholds and
ultimately persistence decisions. Green et al. (2003) find
that product development projects may be terminated
early or prolonged owing to threshold effects. Although
limited, these studies provide early evidence that thresh-
olds affect exit decisions.
Relatedly, rather than focusing on financial results,
some research has analyzed decision-making in family
firms through the lens of behavioral agency (Wiseman
and Gomez-Mejia, 1998), embracing the concepts of
loss aversion (decision-makers tend to minimize
losses) and risk bearing (perceived wealth at risk of loss
makes decision-makers risk averse). This literature ar-
gues that SEW—“the nonfinancial aspects of the firm
that meet the family’s affective needs, such as identity,
the ability to exercise family influence, and the perpet-
uation of the family dynasty” (Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2007, p. 106)—is an important endowment that family
owners seek to protect, even when it leads to suboptimal
financial decisions (see Berrone et al., 2010; Chrisman
and Patel, 2012; Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013;
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007, 2010, 2011; Zellweger
et al., 2011). We next examine how non-economic
motives and thresholds affect exit decisions in family
firms.
2.1 Family firms and performance thresholds
The SEW perspective provides initial insights into dif-
fering performance thresholds in family and non-family
firms. Berrone et al. (2012, p. 258) note that “SEW is the
most important differentiator of the family firm as a
unique entity and, as such, helps explain why family
firms behave distinctively.” SEW is composed of five
elements: family control and influence, family member
identification with the firm, binding social ties, emotion-
al bonds, and the intention to hand the business down to
future generations (Berrone et al., 2012). We examine
each element and its potential impact on performance
thresholds.
Family control and influence refer to family mem-
bers’ desire to maintain both ownership and managerial
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control over strategic decisions and strategic positions
(e.g., CEO and board of directors) (Chua et al., 1999;
Zellweger et al., 2011). This desire may outweigh per-
formance considerations (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007),
and family firms may choose to give up potential
income-generating activities likely to result in loss of
control, suggesting a willingness to establish lower per-
formance thresholds.
The second dimension of SEW is family members’
identification with the firm as an extension of the family
(Berrone et al., 2010). Thus, strategic decisions within
the firm impact the family’s reputation, and decision-
makers are careful to make decisions that reflect posi-
tively on the family image (Sharma and Manikutty,
2005). This concern for the family’s reputation may
make family decision-makers less willing to accept risk
or engage in the entrepreneurial activities necessary to
compete and develop competitive advantage (Covin and
Miles, 1999). Previous research confirms that family
firms engage less in entrepreneurial activities and enter
fewer markets than non-family firms do (Block, 2012;
Graves and Thomas, 2004). This suggests that such
firms may be more content with lower performance
thresholds.
The third component of SEW refers to family firms’
binding social ties (Berrone et al., 2012). Kinship ties
strengthen family members’ commitment to the firm.
Research also demonstrates that such ties may spill over
to long-standing customers and suppliers (Uhlaner,
2006) but make it more difficult for the firm to reduce
its assets or relationships. In the presence of strong ties,
family firms may accept weaker performance from fam-
ily members and may be less willing to raise prices for
long-standing customers or demand higher standards
from long-standing suppliers.
Emotional attachment is the fourth dimension of
SEW. While all organizations exhibit a degree of emo-
tional attachment, the psychological ownership litera-
ture indicates that emotional attachment is stronger
when there is a shared history and knowledge of shared
experiences (Pierce et al., 2003). Families who share
long histories and involvement are likely to have stron-
ger emotional attachment to the firm: “Because the
boundaries between family and corporation are rather
blurred in family businesses ... emotions permeate the
organization, influencing the family firm’s decision-
making process” (Berrone et al., 2012, p. 263). This
may lead to a willingness to accept lower performance
in order to preserve the relationship.
The final dimension of SEW is the intention for
family members of successive generations to take over
the firm, thereby creating a sense of dynasty. Because
the firm must be preserved for future generations, it
symbolizes much more than an asset to be used or sold:
the family firmmust be preserved at all costs. As Akhter
(2016) demonstrates, family firms may close successful
satellite businesses in order to move resources to sustain
the primary family business.
In summary, in family firms, the most important
objective in strategic decisions is to preserve SEW.
The five dimensions of SEW suggest that, compared
with non-family firms, family firms are more willing to
give up potential income-generating activities and thus
accept lower performance thresholds. In formal terms:
Hypothesis 1: Family firms exhibit lower perfor-
mance thresholds than non-family firms.
Furthermore, we expect performance thresholds to
mediate the relationship between family firms and exit,
such that, owing to their lower performance aspirations,
family firms will be more likely to remain in business
than non-family firms will. Many studies corroborate
this posited relationship, suggesting that family firms
are motivated primarily by nonfinancial objectives, of-
ten leading to escalation of commitment (Chirico et al.,
2018; Sharma and Manikutty, 2005; Sirmon and Hitt,
2003). Commitment to nonfinancial goals makes family
firms more willing to accept lower economic returns
(Gimeno et al., 1997; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007;
Zellweger et al., 2013) and be prepared to commit extra
resources such as patient and survivability capital to
persist with the activity (Chirico et al., 2011; Sirmon
and Hitt, 2003).
Relatedly, other studies suggest that family firms
tend to view their businesses not only as sources of
income but also as contexts for family activity and
embodiment of pride and identity (Gimeno et al.,
1997; Meyer and Zucker, 1989; Zellweger et al.,
2013). For example, Meyer and Zucker (1989, p. 79)
argue that, given multiple goals that may divert from
profit maximization, family firms’ continuation “be-
comes an important goal – it is important to continue
the family control, regardless of the profit motive”; thus,
these firms are less likely to exit. Similarly, Gimeno
et al. (1997, p. 758) and Francis and Sandberg (2000)
argue that when entrepreneurs are motivated by non-
economic goals, such as family affective bonds, they
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gain a greater “psychic income from entrepreneurship”
and are therefore willing to accept lower economic
returns (and thus lower thresholds) while continuing
the business. Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: Performance threshold mediates the
relationship between family firms and exit such that
family firms have a lower likelihood of exit than
non-family firms.
3 Data and methods
3.1 Sample
Our study used longitudinal data from the KFS
and, in particular, the proprietary dataset of US
firms. This panel was formed from a random sam-
ple of 32,469 firms from Dun and Bradstreet’s
database of all firms formed in the USA in 2004,
excluding non-profit firms, those owned by an
existing business and firms inherited by someone
else (DesRoches et al., 2010). Our sample included
panel data from 2008 to 2011 (1191 firms in total)
since information on family ownership was not
introduced until 2008. Firms with only one owner
were excluded. About 30 percent of the companies
in our sample were family firms. The firms had
nine employees on average, and around a third had
exited by the end of the last year of our panel
data.
Compared with many firms in the family firm litera-
ture, our sample consisted of younger firms (between 4
and 8 years of age, with a mean of 5.3), making this an
interesting and relevant sample for two reasons. First,
these firms were likely to have been intended to be
family firms from the outset (rather than bringing in a
family member as the first generation ages). Thus, from
the beginning, these firms had been immersed in the
family decision-making process. Second, we believe
that if we find support for our hypotheses in young
family firms, the effect may be even stronger in longer
established family firms, unless (family) commitment
vanishes.
The KFS is particularly well suited to studying
exit in family firms. First, we had uninterrupted
information on the sampled firms from the first
year of founding, allowing us to make use of the
panel nature of the dataset and test exit rates
(Geroski et al., 2010). Second, this dataset pro-
vides information on alternative exit outcomes,
such as mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and
permanent closures, allowing us to conduct post
hoc analyses of different exits (Shah and Winston
Smith, 2012). Third, this dataset not only tracks
the firm’s year of exit in detail but also gives
information on its performance threshold, as well
as its yearly economic performance, which is typ-
ically difficult to obtain from private firms. Thus,
we were able to measure firm threshold systemat-
ically and test whether firms with equal economic
performance were more or less likely to exit.
According to Gimeno et al. (1997, p. 763), when
ventures have equal economic performance, the




Exit The dependent variable is defined as the probabil-
ity that a firm will exit (closure) in a given year. This
binary variable equals 0 when the firm is in operation
and 1 when the firm is no longer in business (Audretsch
and Mahmood, 1995; Dencker et al., 2009; Geroski
et al., 2010; Gimeno et al., 1997). As a robustness test,
we also focused on other modes of exit such as M&As
(see DeTienne et al., 2015).
3.2.2 Independent variables
Family firm Several scholars define family firms as
those in which a family has a significant ownership
stake (Chirico et al., 2011; Sirmon et al., 2008).
Similarly, we measured family firm with a binary vari-
able that equals 1 if a family owns more than 50 percent
of the firm and 0 otherwise. We obtained this informa-
tion from the KFS.
Performance threshold As thresholds are not observ-
able (Gimeno et al., 1997), we relied on a perceptual
measure of the extent to which owners had met their
expectations for growth while controlling for economic
performance. Thresholds of performance are inherently
perceptual (Mortara and Parisot, 2018), based on deci-
sion-makers’ own sense of acceptable levels of
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performance. The KFS asked founders “how much do
you think your business met your expectations for
growth in the last three years?” (DesRoches et al.,
2010, p. 81). The possible responses were “exceeded”
(coded as 1), “met” (coded as 2), and “did not meet”
expectations (coded as 3). Controlling for firm perfor-
mance, and all else being equal, owners who feel they
have met or exceeded their expectations and yet exit the
market are more likely to have low performance thresh-
olds, whereas owners who feel they have not met their
expectations and have exited are more likely to have
high thresholds (Gimeno et al., 1997).
3.2.3 Control variables
We controlled for characteristics of the founder (start-up
experience, industry experience, college degree), firm
(economic performance, size of firm [number of em-
ployees], whether it had received venture capital
funding), and industry (high-tech) that might potentially
influence the likelihood of exit. Founders’ previous
start-up experience may negatively influence firm exit,
as serial entrepreneurs may have gained knowledge
from setting up a business and developing new products,
as well as managing early-stage organizations (Shane
and Stuart, 2002). We measured start-up experience by
summing the number of previous businesses created
across owners and taking the log of this number. We
measured previous industry experience with a binary
variable that equals 1 when owners had previous expe-
rience of starting a venture in the same industry and 0
otherwise. Companies founded by individuals with
industry-specific start-up experience are expected to
perform better, having gained important skills and valu-
able contacts with customers, suppliers, and investors in
the industry (Shane and Stuart, 2002). We controlled for
owner’s education with a binary variable that equals 1
when the owner had a college degree and 0 otherwise
(Geroski et al., 2010).
We used a continuous variable to measure economic
performance by taking the log of the revenues that the
firm had generated. We controlled for the size of the
firm by taking the natural logarithm of the total number
of employees and owners of the business (Geroski et al.,
2010). In addition, we controlled for access to venture
capital (VC) with a binary variable that equals 1 if the
firm had received VC funding and 0 otherwise (Stuart
et al., 1999). Our measure of high-tech industry, adapted
from Hecker’s (2005) definition of high-technology
industries, is a dummy variable indicating whether firms
competed in high-technology areas (Hecker, 2005).1
Finally, we also included industry dummies. We used
the “construction” industry as a comparator, with dum-
my variables for manufacturing, finance, scientific ser-
vices, wholesale and retail trade, information, real estate
and accommodation and food services, healthcare, and
other service industries. All independent and control
variables were lagged by 1 year.
3.3 Model and econometric approach
Survival analysis is widely employed to examine firm
exit (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Dencker et al.,
2009; Geroski et al., 2010; Gimeno et al., 1997; Shah
and Winston Smith, 2012). This methodology allowed
us to study how firms’ exit rates evolved over time. We
estimated the exit model using censored data grouped
into yearly intervals. The Cox proportional hazard mod-
el is a semi-parametric model in which no assumption is
made regarding the underlying distribution of the base-
line hazard (Cox, 1972). This allowed us to define exit
more rigorously than conventional approaches such as
probit or logit analysis (Wooldridge, 2001). Thus, the
Cox model of firm i, industry j and entrepreneur k takes
the form:
hexit t; Fi; Pk;Zi; j;k
 
¼ h tð Þep ο þ βφFi þ βπPk þ βzZi; j;k
 
where hexit is the instantaneous rate of firm exit
conditional on survival until time t, Fi indicates the
family ownership of i, Pk is the performance threshold
of k, and Zi,j,k is a vector of attributes of entrepreneur k,
firm i, and industry j. All covariates were updated yearly
through the inclusion of their (1 year) lagged values. We
1 High-technology areas are NAICS 3345 (navigational, measuring,
electromedical, and control instruments), NAICS 3254 (pharmaceuti-
cal and medicine manufacturing), NAICS 3341 (computer and periph-
eral equipment manufacturing), NAICS 3342 (communications equip-
ment manufacturing), NAICS 3344 (semiconductor and other electron-
ic component manufacturing), NAICS 3332 (industrial machinery
manufacturing), NAICS 3335 (metalworking machinery manufactur-
ing), NAICS 5417 (scientific research and development services),
NAICS 5415 (computer systems design and related services), NAICS
5112 (software publishers), NAICS 3346 (manufacturing and repro-
ducing magnetic and optical media), NAICS 3359 (other electrical
equipment and component manufacturing), NAICS 3364 (aerospace
product and parts manufacturing), NAICS 3329 (other fabricatedmetal
product manufacturing), and NAICS 3251 (basic chemical
manufacturing).
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therefore took account of the influence of time-variant
explanatory variables on firms’ survival rate by model-
ing the probability of exit at time t as a function of
entrepreneur k, firm i, and industry j observed at t–1.
In addition, we employed a random effects ordered
logistic regression to examine differences in thresholds
between family and non-family firms (Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal, 2008).
4 Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations
for the variables. Thirty-five percent (417) of the firms
had exited by year seven. On average, the firms had nine
employees, and the founders had previously started two
businesses. About 30 percent of firms were family
owned, around 60 percent of firm owners had a college
degree, and only one percent of firms had secured VC
funding. Approximately 14 percent of firms were oper-
ating in a high-tech industry, and the average annual
turnover (sales) was more than $2 million. A t-test
analysis revealed that, in our sample, family firms had
fewer employees and lower performance thresholds and
were less likely to have received VC funding than non-
family firms were.2
Table 2 presents the results of the Cox proportional
hazard estimation. The first model of Table 2 includes
the control variables. In model 2, we find that family
firms (β = −0.94, p<0.001) were less likely to exit than
non-family firms. To test hypothesis 1, we performed an
ordinal logistic regression (model 3). We find that fam-
ily firms were (marginally) less likely to have a high
performance threshold (β = −0.20, p<0.1), thus provid-
ing some support for hypothesis 1. To test hypothesis, 2
we followed the multi-stage approach suggested by
Baron and Kenny (1986). We tested the effect of being
a family firm on firm exit (model 2), the effect of the
family firm on performance threshold (model 3), and the
effect of performance threshold on firm exit while con-
trolling for the family firm (partial or full mediation,
model 4).
Our results for models 2 to 4 confirm that perfor-
mance threshold is a partial mediator of the family/exit
relationship, thus providing general support for hypoth-
esis 2. In fact, the performance threshold variable is
positively related to exit as it increases the hazard rate
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by 0.45 (p<0.01), while family firm is negatively related
to exit and its effect is reduced (β = −0.68, p<0.01).
4.1 Robustness tests
We conducted several robustness checks to ensure the
accuracy of our results and checked the sensitivity of our
results to different specifications. First, we tested a
multinomial logistic regression and distinguished be-
tween multiple outcomes, i.e., continuation, exit by
closure, and exit by M&A (Chirico et al., 2020). The
results of this regression, with continuation as the
base outcome, show that family firms had lower
incidences of exit by closure (β = −1.17, p<0.001) and
M&A (β = −1.03), p<0.01) than non-family firms (two-
tailed tests). Second, we tested the effect of being a
family firm on financial performance outcomes and, as
expected, found that family firms performed worse than
non-family firms, yet exited less. This finding corrobo-
rates our theory that family firms may have lower per-
formance thresholds driven by non-economic motives,
so although they perform worse, they exit less.
Third, to test whether differences in actual perfor-
mancemight affect our findings, we added a continuous,
time-varying variable that controlled for the revenues
generated by firms in year t–1. Fourth, we tested the
robustness of the results by using different econometric
models. We employed probit, logit, and cloglog models
to check whether our results were sensitive to model
specifications. None of the results differed from those
reported.
Finally, we performed the Sobel test to establish
whether the effect of being a family firm significantly
decreased with the addition of a performance threshold
(Baron and Kenny, 1986; Sobel, 1982). This revealed
that performance threshold mediates the negative effect
Table 2 Panel data analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exit Exit Performance threshold Exit
Economic performance −0.12*** (0.02) −0.13*** (0.02) −0.24*** (0.05) −0.15*** (0.04)
College degree −0.08 (0.09) −0.05 (0.10) 0.35* (0.15) −0.12 (0.18)
Number of employees −0.44*** (0.10) −0.40*** (0.09) −0.11 (0.11) −0.10 (0.17)
Start-up experience −0.08 (0.07) −0.10 (0.08) 0.14 (0.10) −0.16 (0.14)
Industry experience 0.19 (0.13) 0.19 (0.12) 0.15 (0.18) 0.31 (0.23)
Venture capital 1.46*** (0.45) 1.25** (0.46) 1.10 (1.21) −32.02*** (0.67)
High-tech −0.14 (0.17) −0.12 (0.16) 0.23 (0.24) −0.47 (0.37)
Manufacturing −0.07 (0.15) −0.06 (0.15) 0.14 (0.24) −0.11 (0.30)
Finance −0.02 (0.27) −0.08 (0.27) −0.31 (0.44) 0.05 (0.41)
Scientific services 0.02 (0.14) 0.06 (0.14) −0.27 (0.23) −0.07 (0.26)
Wholesale −0.35 (0.25) −0.35 (0.25) −0.24 (0.33) −0.72 (0.57)
Retail 0.29+ (0.15) 0.38* (0.15) 0.26 (0.29) 0.15 (0.31)
Information −0.53 (0.36) −0.53 (0.35) 0.14 (0.44) −0.45 (0.73)
Real estate −0.34 (0.25) −0.30 (0.25) −0.26 (0.36) −0.84 (0.70)
Accommodation and food services 0.44 (0.34) 0.56* (0.35) −0.37 (0.54) 0.68 (0.53)
Other services −0.42+ (0.24) −0.36 (0.24) −0.08 (0.34) 0.19 (0.32)
Healthcare 0.48 (0.31) 0.61* (0.31) −0.54 (0.67) 0.52 (0.67)
Performance threshold 0.45** (0.15)
Family firm −0.98*** (0.13) −0.20+ (0.15) −0.68** (0.22)
Firms 1191 1191 702 686
Observations 2778 2778 702 686
Log likelihood −2674.55 −2645.53 −688.40 −640.37
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Robust standard errors clustered on the firm cited in the Cox models predicting exit; one-tailed tests for hypothesized relationships; ***
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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of being a family firm on propensity to exit. We also ran
analyses for mediation in structural equation modeling,
which were consistent with the results reported above.
5 Discussion
5.1 Key findings and implications
In this study, we employed a semi-parametric hazard
model to compare the exit rates of family and non-
family firms, using a large sample of 1191 private firms
operating in a range of industries. Our examination of
differences in performance threshold between family
and non-family firms reveals that family firms have
lower performance thresholds than non-family firms
and that high performance thresholds are associated
with a greater likelihood of exit. Performance thresholds
mediate the relationship between family firms and exit,
such that family firms have lower performance thresh-
olds, which decrease the likelihood of exit. These results
are robust to different specifications of exit and the
presence of controls such as economic performance.
Our work directly tests DeTienne and Chirico’s
(2013) arguments and extends Chirico et al.’s (2020)
work by offering a more tailored theory of family firm
exit that combines Gómez-Mejía et al.’s (2007) SEW
perspective with Gimeno et al.’s (1997) performance
threshold logic. Specifically, our study offers a first
attempt to measure performance thresholds empirically
in family and non-family firms and examine their crucial
role in driving firms’ exit strategies. As such, it demon-
strates the key role of performance thresholds in
explaining family firms’ exit where family owners’
decisions are generally driven by nonfinancial factors.
In so doing, we extend Gimeno et al.’s (1997) work
through our conceptual and empirical investigation of
the implications of performance threshold on business
exit in the context of emotionally driven family firms.
Burgelman (1994), among others, argues that exit may
be undermined when emotional logic prevails over busi-
ness logic. DeTienne (2010, p. 210) theorizes that, when
founders and their heirs become so highly “emotionally
involved in their venture to the point that it becomes part
of their identity,” then “not only are they less likely to
develop an exit strategy early in the life of the firm, they
are less likely to consider one over time.” Our focus on
differences in performance thresholds between family
and non-family firms has important implications for the
exit process. Specifically, by identifying performance
threshold as a crucial mediating mechanism influencing
family firm exit, we help clarify why family firms may
be willing to sustain below-target performance owing to
nonfinancial considerations while avoiding or delaying
business exit decisions.
Our study also responds to recent calls to expand
studies of exit processes in family firms beyond the
founder’s succession (DeTienne and Chirico, 2013;
Shepherd, 2009; Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Wennberg
et al., 2010). Exit is an important yet underexplored
process for entrepreneurs, perhaps because it is a
complex multi-level and multi-faceted phenomenon
(DeTienne, 2010; Wennberg et al., 2010). This study
helps resolve a tension in the family literature regard-
ing family firm exit and contributory factors (Salvato
et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2013) by offering compel-
ling arguments that nonfinancial attributes may affect
family firms’ attitudes toward different performance
levels and their related decisions to exit. Given the
prevalence of family firms worldwide and the strate-
gic importance of exit decisions, this study makes an
important contribution to the exit literature by shed-
ding light on why family firms’ owners decide to
persist with their ventures. Our post hoc analyses
reveal that family firms are more likely than non-
family firms to continue and to resist different forms
of exit (closure, M&A) owing to their lower perfor-
mance thresholds.
Our study also reveals that exit decisions are partic-
ularly difficult for firms owned and ran by families.
Based on our examination of a larger, longitudinal da-
tabase and investigation of self-identified first-genera-
tion family firms, it seems quite feasible that the longer a
family firm exists, the more difficult exit decisions
become. As Salvato et al. (2010, p. 322) note, “The
generational shadow casts an enduring effect as ances-
tors’ pathways are considered sacred grounds ... Each
generation begins to view itself as a steward of the past
legacy in the form of their family business.” However,
our finding that even first-generation family firms have
lower exit rates than non-family firms provides insight
into how rapidly the family begins to identify with the
firm, develop a performance threshold, and make deci-
sions about long-term continuation. While previous
studies indicate that older family firms are less likely
to divest (Dehlen et al., 2014), ours is the first to show
that this tendency arises early in the life of the family
firm.
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Furthermore, this work contributes to a growing
body of exit research that seeks to gain a better under-
standing of the dynamics of both firm and entrepreneur-
ial exit and why some firms persist even though their
performance may indicate they should exit (or be select-
ed out of) the market. Our paper advances this research
by developing a perceptual measure of thresholds that
reinforces Gimeno et al.’s (1997) work. Just as the pain
threshold may help explain why some individuals take
more pain medicine or return to work earlier, the per-
formance threshold indicates why some founders/family
members make decisions to persist. In doing so, this
research implies that various contextual factors may
contribute to thresholds beyond family firms. For exam-
ple, if family firm control affects thresholds, other own-
ership structures (e.g., 100% founder ownership versus
various forms of equity ownership) may do the same. If
family member identification affects thresholds, might
the level of the founder’s personal identity associated
with the firm also affect the performance threshold? For
example, Justo et al. (2015) demonstrate that women are
no less likely to “fail” than men are but are much more
likely to exit a venture. They speculate that this may be
because men have a stronger identity (“I am the busi-
ness”) than women do. Our measurement, testing, and
findings of perceptual thresholds lend credence to other
unexplored relationships.
5.2 Limitations and future research
This study has some limitations. First, we were limited to
a perceptual measure of performance threshold, since
threshold is not observable. Future research might ex-
plore how firms’ actual growth rates relate to their per-
ceived thresholds.3 According to Gimeno et al. (1997),
the performance threshold is the level of performance
below which the owners of an organization will act to
dissolve it. We therefore compared expectations of
growth between family and non-family firms while con-
trolling for economic performance. Future researchmight
seek to identify thresholds in more detail by mapping out
the impact of past growth rates vis-à-vis perceptions. Our
finding that family firms have lower performance thresh-
olds than non-family firms is important. Differences in
performance threshold between entrepreneurs are not yet
well understood, and future research might explore
whether there are systematic differences in aspirations
between family owners and whether different family
attributes interact with performance thresholds. Several
important relationships emerge from our control
variables that may form the basis for future applications
of threshold theory within and outside family firms. For
example, entrepreneurs with college education have
consistently higher performance thresholds, whereas
firms with higher revenues have lower performance
thresholds. Relatedly, although they did not directly test
performance thresholds, DeTienne and Cardon (2012)
use a threshold argument to examine family succession.
They contend that higher education will result in a higher
performance threshold and find that education is
negatively related to a family succession exit strategy.
Similarly, Siepel et al. (2017) examined founders’ thresh-
olds for exit, finding that lack of managerial skills is
associated with lower thresholds, but that this varies with
the age of the firm. Further researchmight explore wheth-
er other attributes of the firm or owner characteristics
interact with performance thresholds, such as how the
presence of a non-family CEO, the size, and experience
of the board of directors and other board characteristics
(Wilson et al., 2013) may influence performance thresh-
olds and exits in the family context.
Our study examined firm exits in firms based in the
USA. The generalizability of our results is thus limited,
and future research should examine exits in different
countries and contexts. Furthermore, as this study focused
on privately owned firms, it would be interesting to
examine exits by publicly traded companies to establish
whether they behave differently from privately held firms,
given their greater competition and market pressures.
Researchers might also consider investigating perfor-
mance thresholds in other contexts that, similarly to
family firms, arouse intense emotional commitment to
the business. These might include ventures with a strong
social or sustainable component and those where the
founder is passionate about the firm’s ability to contrib-
ute to societal wealth (Sarason and Hanley, 2015).
Researchers should thus consider including perfor-
mance thresholds in research on exits in social ventures
(Austin et al., 2006; Lortie, 2015, p. 228). Other ven-
tures with intense emotional commitments might in-
clude those resulting from a personal passion, such as
golf (e.g., a new type of club or golf game) or music
(online training or adaptations of existing musical in-
struments to new genres). Other contexts may prove to
have varying performance thresholds, thereby helping
to explain why some firms persist over long periods3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment.
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with poor performance and why some firms exit the
market with high levels of performance.
In summary, our study contributes to sharpening our
understanding of exit in family firms while motivating
future work on exit strategies in family firms and other
contexts.
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